This paper critically examines the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct and pre-empt the behaviour of football supporters. It is shown how, in the Netherlands, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, profiling and punishing 'risky' supporters, with important implications for supporters' civil liberties. The paper concludes by proposing two broad avenues for future research drawing on the work of Michel Foucault: the interaction between technologies of domination and technologies of the self, and the modes of resistance or 'counter-conduct' in the everday practices of football supporters.
Introduction
In July 2008, the then Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, announced a set of new and expanded measures, such as mobile telephone taps and comprehensive banning orders, to combat football (soccer) hooliganism. The new measures introduced by the Dutch government hardly came as a surprise. Indeed, they constituted the next incremental step in a process that spans more than three decades. 1 At the root of this process is the 'dispositif of precautionary risk', a 2 dominant risk logic in late modern society. 2 The security techniques of risk developed and used in the football context seek to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. As will be shown in this paper, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of spectator behaviour at football matches implies the identification, classification and close monitoring of risk and 'risky' populations, and involves a dispersed and fragmented set of public and private actors. Any potential or actual transgressive behaviour by football supporters is typically constructed as a social threat, the prevention and control of which requires the imposition of extra punishments, far-reaching surveillance and the expansion of legal powers. 3 A key aspect of the dispositif of precautionary risk in the governing of football supporters is the continued expansion of the possibilities (both legal and technical) for the collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of data on spectators. Under the banner of 'intelligence-led' or 'knowledge-based' policing, there is a growing emphasis on prediction, anticipation and preventive action. This trend signals a mode of surveillance that can be termed anticipatory surveillance or 'systematic predetection', the objective of which is 'not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger', in order to reduce uncertainty and to control outcomes. 4 This 'new penology' seeks techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness and risk. 5 As Castel notes, this mode of surveillance 'dispenses with actual presence, contract, the reciprocal relationship of watcher and watched'. Instead, it 'can be practiced without any contact with, or even any immediate representation of, the subjects under scrunity'. 6 The aim of this paper, then, is to critically examine the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct and pre-empt the behaviour of football supporters. I use the term 'technologies' to focus attention on the actual mechanisms through which authorities have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct of football spectators in order to achieve the objective they consider desirable. 7 Although the analysis will focus primarily on the Netherlands, I argue that the technologies of government in this specific context are part of, and reflect, a dispositif of precautionary risk that transcends this particular society and can be found in a number of European countries and at a European level. 8 Evidence has been presented for this argument in recent analyses of security 3 and sport events, such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. 9 Moreover, I argue that the security assemblage that seeks to control football spectator behaviour transcends this particular security environment. The boundaries between different security environments are increasingly blurred. As will be seen, some of the risk management techniques that were initially developed and applied at football matches have come to be used in different environments, usually without proper evaluation of their actual effectiveness and proportionality.
Drawing on Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality, which views government as the 'conduct of conduct', 10 I will show how the governing of football supporters features not only direct intervention by means of specialized state and non-state apparatuses, but also more indirect and dispersed techniques for directing and controlling spectator behaviour. Government is understood here in a broad sense as any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. 11 For Foucault, the finality of government 'resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics'. 12 My approach aligns with that of Bale, who argues that the collective experience of sports spectators has increasingly become one of 'segmented and panopticised confinement' characterized by seemingly indispensable technologies and geographies of rationalized order and surveillance (e.g. CCTV, surveillance, security personnel, assigned entrances and seating, and directed spectator traffic flows). 13 These technologies, it can be argued, are disciplinary matrices that create 'docile bodies' (controlled, regulated bodies) which are easy to control by people in authority. 14 As such, they seek to reshape the ways in which each individual, at some future point, will conduct him-or herself in a space of regulated freedom. 15 The football stadium and its surroundings can be seen to function as a laboratory in that 4 they have come to constitute a site for the production of knowledge about those under observation, and a place for experimentation and training. This metaphor of the football stadium as a laboratory is discussed in the next section, which examines the evolution of security and risk management technologies at football matches in the Netherlands.
From electronic identity card to biometric identification: the football stadium as technological laboratory
Technology plays a major role in the dispositif of precautionary risk at professional football matches in the Netherlands. Until the late 1980s entrance controls at Dutch football stadia were fairly straightforward: stewards checked paper tickets by hand and spectators who possessed a valid ticket were allowed to stand or sit wherever they pleased on the designated terrace. This began to change in the 1990s, when football stadia became increasingly segmented into different sectors and sections, automatic entrance controls and numbered seats were introduced, CCTV systems and central command posts were set up, and spectators were searched at the entrance. By now, the security gaze was firmly in place.
This development took a new turn with the introduction of a compulsory membership scheme known as the 'club card'. A first experiment with the scheme was conducted as early as 1989 at five football clubs whose supporters were classified as being 'high risk'. Match tickets were sold only to those supporters holding an electronic identity card issued by their club. On the first day of the pilot many supporters successfully circumvented the new scheme, which led to its postponement. However, due to renewed fears of escalating violence at football matches and further attempts to commercialize the game, a comparable identity card scheme was introduced at all Eredivisie (Premier League) clubs during the 1996/97 season. The club card was marketed as a service card designed to improve the club's service to its customers, 16 but was viewed by many football supporters as yet another attempt to regulate the behaviour of a 'violent minority' at the expense of non-violent football supporters. 17 The controversy surrounding the compulsory membership scheme entered a new phase with the proposed introduction of a club card with photo identification. A number of football clubs opposed this new measure from the outset, arguing that it 5 would decrease the clubs' revenue from ticket sales as spectators would no longer be allowed to purchase match tickets without a registered electronic identity card. As a result of the resistance of both clubs and supporter associations, the identity card scheme was eventually given a non-compulsory status. Clubs were left to decide whether to issue club cards and, consequently, most clubs only utilized the card scheme to manage ticket sales at fixtures they deemed 'high risk'. However, five football clubs obliged their supporters to submit their personal details and a photograph to the Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB; Royal Netherlands Football Association), either for away matches or for both home and away matches.
Although the identity card is often viewed as a customer service tool, it should be considered, first and foremost, a security measure. The Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme (CIV; Dutch National Football Information Point) describes its uses as follows: 'In the longer term the plan was that security aspects could be built into [the card scheme]. An important final phase of the entire policy chain is controlled access control, the aim of which is to enable us to keep undesirable individuals out of the stadium'. 18 Today, supporters at all professional football clubs World Cup in Germany). During the application process a biometric passport photograph is produced. On matchdays, spectators enter the stadium through a sluice system. The antennas at the gates of the stadium detect the club card and check its validity. In the tunnel a facial photograph is produced, which is compared to the biometric data recorded during the application process. If the authentication process determines that it is the same person, the gate opens automatically. In case the photographs do not match, the gates remain closed and the spectator is forced to go back.
The biometric identification scheme at ADO The Hague FC, which integrates biometrics with existing ticketing and CCTV systems, was designed by a private business, Happy Crowd Control (HCC). HCC describes itself as a world-leader in safety and security for any crowd at any ground, event centre or high security location. Happy Crowd Control is an innovative system, allowing user-friendly and fast access. Particularly for those locations where large numbers of people have daily access, such as stadium grounds, music centres, airports, high security offices or locations, schools, payment locations, casinos, prisons and so on. 22 HCC prides itself on providing 'safety and security from entrance to exit', arguing that 'the certainty that known troublemakers, or those who misbehave, will be apprehended or prevented from entering the stadium at all, gives a sense of security.
... In case of problems with misbehaviour, troublemakers can easily be recognised and banned'. 23 The Happy Crowd Control system is believed to 'reduce risk to a minimum, making it almost impossible to get away with undesirable conduct'. 24 The use of biometric identification at football matches highlights how the 7 bodies of spectators are becoming redefined in terms of information; that is, they become informatized. 25 Van der Ploeg demonstrates how bodily characteristics, once they have been translated into electronically processable data, are amenable to forms of analysis and classification. 26 First, as the above example shows, authentication classifies spectators as either legitimate or illegitimate, wanted or unwanted, low risk or high risk. On a next level, idenfication categorizes spectators according to the type and purpose of the database against which the biometric signal is checked.
Spectators may be identified as someone with a banning order or a criminal record, or as being 'associated' with a high-risk supporter group. A third level of analysis and categorization consists of the bringing together of biometric information with other types of data, such as that recorded in police and club databases, on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. This profiling process will be further examined later on in the paper.
First, however, I will address the issue of dataveillance: the systematic use and linking of personal data systems in the monitoring and investigation of football spectator behaviour.
Dataveillance: centralizing and decentralizing tendencies
In The Information Age trilogy, Manuel Castells dismisses the Orwellian Big Brother scenario in which the state has almost total control over the population. 27 Instead, Castells argues that the capacity for surveillance is diffused in society: beyond the boundaries of the state, beyond the public/private divide, and beyond national borders. 28 Although new information technologies might be put to the service of surveillance, control and repression by state institutions, they might also be used for citizens to enhance their control over the state and to access information. 29 New information technologies also create opportunities for criminal and terrorist networks to evade or confront state institutions, for example through developing new modes of organization and communication. For Castells, the most important aspect of this development is in the gathering of information on individuals by business firms, and organizations of all kinds, and in the creation of a market for this information. He notes: 'Rather than an oppressive "Big Brother," it is a myriad of well-wishing "little sisters," relating to each one of us on a personal basis because they know who we are, who have invaded all realms of life'. 30 The extension of 8 surveillance beyond the boundaries of the state is most clearly captured in the notion of 'surveillance society', which indicates that surveillance activities have long since spilled over the edges of governmental bureaucracies to flood every conceivable social conduit. While the state still accounts for much monitoring of everyday life, such government activities are just one of many areas within which surveillance data now flows. 31 New opportunities for surveillance show both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. On the one hand, the opportunities for governments to access and integrate the data that is available from a range of state and non-state actors are increasing. On the other hand, new opportunities for observation and analysis are now within the reach of a growing number of actors, including businesses and individual citizens. 32 These general tendencies can also be observed in Dutch professional football.
The government has a leading role in security policy, but at the same time other parties have become more prominent: KNVB, football clubs, private security companies, organizations that specialize in data recording and provision (such as Cotass in the case of the club card and Happy Crowd Control and Tebrona in relation to iris scanner technology) 33 , and supporter associations. For example, football clubs play an important part in the application of new technologies and in the collection and exchange of general and personal information on supporters. As the organizers of football matches, they are required to do everything in their powers to ensure safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the match. This includes keeping 'unwanted' spectators out of the stadium and preventing spectators from bringing prohibited items such as weapons, fireworks or bottles into the stadium. Depending on the severity of the offense, clubs can also impose banning orders on individual spectators.
Databases
A central component of Dutch policy in the area of football and security is the development and integration of data systems that contain general and personal information on football supporters and groups. The first national database in this 9 field dates back to the mid 1980s. During this period football hooliganism became a more prominent subject on the Dutch political agenda due to a number of highprofile spectator incidents both in the Netherlands and internationally. 34 The 1985
Heysel stadium disaster in Belgium further heightened concerns about the potential lethality of football hooliganism and resulted in the introduction of a series of internationally agreed countermeasures, which were also adopted in the Netherlands. 35 The CIV was established in 1986 with the aim to collect, analyze and disseminate information on spectator behaviour. A new data system was created to facilitate this process. Some European countries have developed a similar centralized data management system, for example the Striker database in the United Kingdom.
The national database now contains a module in which police can enter personal information on so-called 'high-risk' supporters. This module includes an overview of what are deemed to be the top 500 high-risk supporters in the Netherlands as well as of the top 10 'hooligans' or 'ringleaders' in individual police districts. These lists are composed on the basis of registered offenses and specific intelligence provided by police and security officials. The objective is for all police forces to be aware who these supporters are in order to enable accurate risk assessment and to anticipate any potential misbehaviour. 36 On previous occasions, such as during the European Championships held in the Netherlands and Belgium in 2000, individuals on the top 500 list received letters warning them that they would be closely monitored during the tournament. Although police continue to play a leading role in dataveillance in the area of football and security, inter-agency cooperation has increased significantly over time. Football clubs are now able to use and enter their own data into the system, such as information on spectator incidents, 'problematic' individuals or groups, expected spectator flows, and safety and security arrangements.
More recently, police and public prosecutors have appealed to the general public using the internet and television in an attempt to identify and arrest suspected supporters. In the aftermath of an incident at a match between Feyenoord and Ajax in 2005, during which 42 police officers were injured, police were able to use information provided by the television audience to identify some of the suspects. In As noted earlier, one form of analysis and classification in anticipatory surveillance consists of the bringing together of different types of information on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. With regard to the databases discussed above, a key point here is that to be suspected of being a 'potential troublemaker', it is no longer necessary to exhibit manifest symptoms of dangerousness; instead, it is sufficient to display whatever characteristics police and other specialists have constituted as risk factors. 37 Put differently, it is enough to have the characteristics or profile of a 'hooligan' to be treated as if one had committed a football-related crime. Once one is registered as such, there tends to be little escape. The implications for football supporters' civil liberties are profound, yet arguably more so in the United Kingdom, where the 2000 Football (Disorder) Act gives police officers the power to detain and ban those seeking to travel abroad if it is suspected that they will become involved in disorder. These football banning orders 'on complaint' have been criticized for infringing the fundamental rights of supporters who have not been convicted of any offence, and their proportionality and legitimacy has been seriously questioned. 38 However, the Dutch case also highlights some of the problematic consequences of anticipatory surveillance. To give one example, encountered during my own research, a Dutch football supporter was arrested during a preventive group arrest aimed at preventing a confrontation between rival supporters outside the 11 stadium after a football match. Although the charges against the individual were subsequently dropped, the five-year banning order that was initially imposed was never revoked. The individual's personal data and alleged 'association' with a group of 'high-risk' supporters, which appeared to be entirely coincidental, were never removed from the national data system. As a consequence, he continues to be blacklisted as an unwanted supporter and has not been allowed to attend football matches in the Netherlands. Below the issue of risk profiling is further discussed in relation to the risk analysis matrices that are now used in the Netherlands to categorize and profile football matches and supporter groups.
Risk assessment and classification
Prior to every professional football match in the Netherlands, the municipality, police force and football clubs involved draw on the available information to assess the safety and security risks associated with the match. Based on this risk assessment the match is categorized in terms of the level of risk, and risk minimization strategies are put in place. The risk assessment takes into account, among other factors:
-the presence of supporters who are known to be violent and the threat of confrontations between rival supporter groups;
-the underlying culture of the supporter groups to be policed (e.g. behaviour, motivations and intentions); -any factors likely to impact on risk, such as the activities of other groups (e.g. opposition supporters and/or local communities), sensitivities, history, etc.; -any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, football supporters or groups. 39 In the 2005/06 season the CIV, in cooperation with the KNVB and representatives of clubs and regional police forces, introduced a 'risk analysis matrix' and attendant checklist to enable an improved and more systematic assessment of the security risks of football matches. Both police and clubs enter a part of the matrix with information on risk factors and planned security and safety arrangements. Clubs collect a range of information on supporters through data systems (season ticket holders, club card holders, biometric identification) and through their safety and security organization 12 (security coordinator, fan coordinator, stewards, etc.). This information is shared with police and local government.
The grading of football matches into risk levels (A, B or C), as summarized in Table 1 , is based on the information recorded in the risk analysis matrix. A football match is labeled a 'risk match' (Category B or C) if the analysis of the available information and experiences suggests the need for extra attention for public order disturbances. Comparable classifications are used in a number of European countries, albeit with some variation. During the 2010-2011 season, 48% of matches were classified as A, 47% as B, and 5% as C. 40 The risk analysis matrix is used by police to advise the mayor of the municipality where the game is to be played on the appropriate security arrangements, such as the deployment of police officers, ticketing and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the sale of alcohol at the stadium.
The football clubs involved use the matrix to determine the deployment of security personnel. Information recorded in the matrix is also used to develop more or less specific and detailed profiles of the supporter groups involved. those away supporters who comply with the travel arrangement. The CIV describes this travel restriction as an important measure to control and plan the flow of away supporters to and from the stadium. 41 However, as I have shown elsewhere, most 13 supporters perceive this measure as negatively influencing their match-day experience since it obstructs their freedom of movement. 42 The combiregeling is now a standard travel restriction for Category C matches, and can also be imposed for spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event'. 45 In contrast, a non-risk supporter is a person who does not pose a risk to public order at or in connection with a football event.
As noted earlier, being classified as a Category C or 'risk' supporter can have very real and practical consequences for individual supporters despite research showing the fallacies of this approach to policing football supporters. 46 The EU Handbook definition's reference to persons who pose a possible risk, as opposed to an actual, 'known' risk, is problematic because of the serious infringement of the targeted individual's civil rights and liberties. 47 
Perpetrator and group profiling
In recent years, a significant development in the policing of football crowds in the Netherlands has been the application of a perpetrator-orientated approach. The Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events. 52 International police cooperation in this area operates primarily on the meso and micro levels. The meso level consists of 'the formal structures within which day-today operational police work occurs', such as the organizational structures of police units, practices and procedures, and bilateral and multilateral agreements that exist to promote cooperation in this area. 53 The micro level, on the other hand, is During the World Cup the transport police and customs were also connected to the system. 57 Although these examples indicate the increased Europeanization of intelligence-led policing at football matches, international cooperation in this area is work in progress, with regular attempts being made by national and international 17 authorities to improve cooperation. Major differences continue to exist between different countries in terms of both the actual implementation of arrangements and the quality of information provided. 58 International police cooperation in the area of football and security at the micro and meso levels is driven and controlled by the macro level, that is,
international law and what Ericson calls 'counter-law'. 59 We The temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement, as well as the other security techniques discussed in this paper, raise an important issue: that of the normalization of extraordinary security and risk management technologies. This process involves a shift from a classical 'state of exception' -where temporary security measures that involve the suspension or curtailment of fundamental liberties and rights are introduced to prevent a 'catastrophic event' -to 'an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government'. 63 The conditions of emergency create a 'new normal'. In the dispositif of precautionary risk, any level of risk is considered unacceptable; risk must be avoided at all cost. Thus, Dean argues, 'the existence of the exception reframes the very idea of normality'. 64 In this paper I have shown how, in relation to Dutch football, an advanced security assemblage is now at the permanent disposal of authorities in their quest to pre-empt and minimize risk. Although security and risk management technologies play out differently in different places, there are also major patterns of convergence. 
Discussion and conclusion
This paper has analyzed the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands. These technologies, it was shown, seek to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. Risk is calculated via a multi-layered system that links diverse surveillance techniques ranging from CCTV and human intelligence to electronic dossiers and biometric identification. Preemptive risk management in the governing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, profiling and punishing 'risky' supporters. Although the government, and particularly police, continue to play a central role in the networked approach to preventing and controlling football hooliganism, new actors have become decidedly more prominent in this process, most notably football clubs, the KNVB and private businesses.
The techniques of risk calculation and risk management discussed in this paper penetrate the life world of football supporters, with important implications for supporters' civil liberties and basic rights. The autonomy and civil liberties of football supporters have clearly diminished. Supporters are more and more controlled and disciplined, and have less freedom to set their own behavioural tolerance levels. If we take into consideration the recent trends in other social contexts in which preemptive risk management and anticipatory surveillance have become the norm, 71 we can conclude that situations in which football supporters will be confronted with precautionary measures against them, without their having actively contributed to this process and without there being any manifest signs of 'dangerousness', will probably proliferate.
One ought to be cautious, however, not to over-state processes of discipline.
Individuals are far from passive victims of the system. In his later work, Michel 20 Foucault recognized that he had too strongly stressed processes of discipline. 72 Instead, he now sought to investigate the interaction between technologies of domination and 'technologies of the self'. 73 Foucault argues: '[G]overning people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed of modified by himself'. 74 In this context, Schinkel signals the harnessing of a new form of surveillance: selfveillance, a technology of self-control in which the body is both the controlling and controlled agency. 75 The biometric identifiers (iris scan; fingerprints) used to regulate access at some football stadia in the Netherlands are a clear example of this. The good behaviour contracts for football supporters that have been used at clubs such as FC Utrecht and
Feyenoord are another example of attempts to make supporters into 'morally responsible subjects' that bear the responsibility for self-managing their own conduct. In short, the interaction between technologies of the self and technologies of domination in the area of football and security deserve far greater research attention.
Another important (and closely related) avenue for future research can be gleaned from the work of Foucault: the modes of resistance or 'counter-conduct' in the everday practices of football supporters, especially those used to strategically countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices. 76 Foucault argues that 'where there is power there is resistance'. 77 The history of government as the conduct of conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting 'counter-conducts'. 78 For Foucault, resistance is present everywhere power is exercised; the network of power relations is paralleled by (and, in fact, depends for its existence on) a multiplicity of forms of resistance. 79 To fully grasp the practical workings and the unanticipated consequences of the risk logics discussed in this paper, then, it is necessary to also take into account the ways in which football supporters respond to and anticipate the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct their behaviour. Herein lies an important task for researchers in the field of security and sport events.
